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I. INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, the private employment field has begun to
experiment with the use of arbitration and other dispute resolution
techniques in response to the explosion of federal employment litigation and
claims that continue to strain judicial and administrative systems. Since the
mid-1960s, the creation of employment laws protecting employee civil
rights has increased at a dramatic rate, resulting in a complex regulatory
system with varying procedures, requirements and remedies.' Subsequent
efforts to enforce employee rights under these laws have overwhelmed the
federal courts and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC). For example, a United States Department of Labor and Commerce
report states that between 1971 and 1991, employment law cases filed in
federal district courts increased 430%, from 4,331 in 1971 to 22,968 in
1991.2 Between 1981 and 1993, the number of complaints filed with the
EEOC increased 56%, from 56,228 in 1981 to 87,942 in 1993.
3
Employers, faced with an increasingly litigious workforce, are
1 Illustrative examples of employment laws promulgated since 1960 include the Equal
Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994) (prohibiting wage discrimination on the basis of
sex); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994) (prohibiting
workplace discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin); the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994)
(prohibiting workplace discrimination on the basis of age); the Older Workers Benefit
Protection Act (OWBPA), 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994) (amending the ADEA): the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1462 (1994)
(protecting employee pension benefits); the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability); the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1994) (providing damages in cases of
intentional discrimination); the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §
2601 (1994) (allowing employees to take leave for family and medical emergencies).
2 See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENTS OF LABOR AND COMMERCE, FACT FINDING
REPORT: COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER MANAGEMENT RELATIONS (1994).
3 See id.
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responding by looking to extra-judicial channels to resolve disputes.
Corporations are augmenting in-house dispute resolution channels to address
potential lawsuits at an early stage as well as encouraging their employees to
use private services specializing in mediation and post-dispute arbitration.
One of the more controversial efforts of alternative dispute resolution is the
use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in employee contracts or corporate
handbooks. A typical pre-dispute arbitration clause is a generic, broad
statement essentially ensuring that the employee agrees to submit to binding
arbitration any and all disputes arising under his employment. The nature of
the pre-dispute arbitration clause has engendered the term "mandatory
arbitration" because the prospective employee usually signs the contract
before he begins work and before any potential issues arise with the
employer. Thus, arbitration becomes "mandatory" even though not
necessarily foreseen. At the moment an employee begins his job, he already
has made the weighty decision not to look to the federal courts to enforce
his civil rights under the myriad laws ensuring their protection.
For their part, the private nonunion employers generally have embraced
arbitration as an efficient and cost-effective forum for resolving employment
related disputes, 4 including those involving civil rights. Not until the
securities industry first initiated arbitration clauses as a pre-employment
condition, however, did some in the labor and employment community
seriously begin to question the fairness of arbitration for its participants. As
the use of pr-employment arbitration clauses proliferated in the securities
industry, certain actors concerned with labor and employment rights,
including judges, executive agencies, private providers of alternative
dispute resolution, employment analysts and others, began to consider the
drawbacks of mandatory arbitration, especially when it was used to enforce
federal civil rights.5
4 For example, Michael Hoellering, General Counsel of the American Arbitration
Association (AAA), the nation's largest private provider of ADR services, stated that 95% of
the arbitrations handled by the AAA last year were submitted by parties that had agreed on
arbitration before a dispute arose. AAA General Counsel Discusses Nonunion Employment
Disputes, Empl. Pol. & L. Daily (BNA), d9 (Feb. 17, 1995). See also R. Gaull Silberman et
al., Alternative Dispute Resolution of Employment Discrimination Claims, 54 LA. L. REV.
1533, 1536 (1994) ("Employers increasingly are adopting internal ADR methods... as ADR
procedures have improved and litigation grown more time-consuming and costly, doubts
about whether ADR should play [any] role in civil rights enforcement have significantly
diminished.") (citations omitted). Ms. Silberman is the Vice Chairman of the EEOC.
5 See, e.g., Mark D. Klimek, Discrimination Claims Under Ttle VII: Where Mandatory
Arbitration Goes Too Far, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 425, 425 (1993) ("Absent an
explicit ruling by the Supreme Court, agreements to arbitration such as [those involving Title
VII disputes] should not be enforceable."); Wendy S. Tien, Note, Compulsory Arbitration of
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These actors' critical responses to mandatory arbitration apparently
correspond to the degree of voluntariness in selecting arbitration. When
employees voluntarily choose arbitration, some of the skeptical
commentators more readily acknowledge its benefits as an efficient and
binding alternative to lengthy and costly judicial enforcement. 6 Yet, as an
employee's selection of arbitration becomes less voluntary, that is, when
arbitration, especially of civil rights claims, becomes a condition of
employment, the skeptics are less willing to accept arbitration as a means of
enforcing civil rights.
As the debate surrounding the use of pre-dispute arbitration for
resolving employment discrimination claims continues to rage, labor and
employment rights actors have responded with various levels of intensity.
Some participants advocate an outright rejection of mandatory arbitration
for civil rights claims, while others focus on improving certain procedural
aspects of the arbitration process. The reaction to arbitration as well as
possible suggestions for reform may be more easily critiqued if the analysis
focuses on three separate stages in the pre-dispute arbitration process: (1)
the formation of the contract itself, (2) the procedures that govern the
proceeding after arbitration is invoked, and (3) the availability of judicial
review of arbitration decisions.
This paper focuses on the responses of the courts, the national
legislature, the EEOC, private providers of ADR and certain policy groups,
to the increasing use of mandatory arbitration. First, the paper gives a
general overview of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,7 the seminal
ADA Claims: Disabling the Disabled, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1443, 1472 (1993) ("Congress did
not intend binding arbitration to be an exclusive remedy for ADA disputes."); see also Brief
of American Association of Retired Persons as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 16-
18, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane, 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (No. 90-18) (arguing that
compulsory arbitration is not appropriate forum for resolving discrimination claims). But see
Rick Bales & Reagan Burch, The Future of Employment Arbitration in the Nonunion Sector,
45 LAB. L.J. 627, 635 (1994) ("Congress should not jeopardize the development of an
arbitration system that can furnish fair and expeditious dispute resolution in the workplace.");
Marshall W. Grate, Binding Arbitration of Statutory Employment Discrimination Claims, 70
U. DST. MERCY L. REV. 699, 719 (1993) ("[Blinding arbitration could ... become the
cornerstone of national labor policy."); Gerard Morales & Kelly Humphrey, The
Enforceability ofAgreements to Arbitrate Employment Disputes, 43 LAB. L.J. 663, 670 (1992)
("CEinforcement of agreements to arbitrate disputes arising from individual employment
contracts is entirely consistent with the established national policy favoring arbitration of labor
disputes.").
6 See, e.g., Tien, supra note 5, at 1472-1473 (arguing that voluntary arbitration of
ADA disputes is acceptable, although binding arbitration is not).
7 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
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1991 United States Supreme Court case that opened the federal court
floodgates for the use of pre-dispute arbitration. Second, the paper surveys
the federal cou'rts' response to Gilmer, listing which civil rights claims may
be arbitrated according to the courts, surveying some recent decisions more
critical of the arbitration process and analyzing the federal court use of
judicial review of arbitration involving civil rights claims. Third, the paper
summarizes the general responses of the legislature, the EEOC, private
dispute resolution providers and employment policy groups regarding
mandatory arbitration, and specifically analyzes where each group's
response has focused among the three stages of mandatory arbitration.
Finally, the paper analyzes the future direction of mandatory arbitration and
offers solutions that focus on improving voluntariness at the contracting
stage and expanding judicial review of arbitration.
II. GILMER V. INTXRSTATEIJOHNsON LANE CORP.
In 1991, the Supreme Court, in the 7-to-2 decision Gilmer v.
InterstatefJohnson Lane Corp., signaled that it would accept the use of pre-
dispute arbitration clauses, at least in the securities industry context, and
thus encouraged federal court acceptance of mandatory arbitration clauses in
the private employment sector.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. employed Robert Gilmer as a Manager
of Financial Services in May of 1981.8 As a condition of his employment,
Interstate required him to register as a securities representative with several
stock exchanges, including the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). 9 Gilmer
completed a securities registration application form which provided that he
and his employer would "'arbitrate any dispute, claim, or controversy'
arising between [them]... 'that is required to be arbitrated under the rules,
constitutions, or by-laws of the organizations' with which [Gilmer]
registered." 10 The "NYSE Rule 347 provides for arbitration of any
controversy between a registered representative and any member.., arising
out of the employment or termination of employment of such registered
representative." 11
In 1987, Interstate fired Gilmer, who was then sixty-two years old. 12
Gilmer filed an age discrimination claim with the EEOC 13 and later brought
an age discrimination suit against Interstate in the United States District






OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Court for the Western District of North Carolina, alleging that Interstate
had discharged him in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA).14 Interstate sought to compel arbitration of the ADEA claim
pursuant to the arbitration agreement in Gilmer's registration application.
15
The District Court denied Interstate's motion, citing the Supreme Court
decision Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.16 in support of its conclusion
that ADEA claimants should be protected from waiver of a judicial forum.
17
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.18
Justice White, writing for the majority, affirmed the Fourth Circuit and
held that Gilmer's ADEA claim was arbitrable. 19 Relying on the mandate of
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)20 and recent Court decisions favoring
arbitration, the Court held that all statutory claims are appropriate for
arbitration "'unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a
waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue."' 21 The
Congressional intention to preclude arbitration may be found in the text of
the statute, the legislative history or in an "inherent conflict" between
arbitration and the statute's purposes.2 The Court found, and Gilmer
conceded, that nothing in the text or legislative history of the ADEA
precludes arbitration.3
In addition, the Court did not accept Gilmer's arguments that
mandatory arbitration of ADEA claims would be inconsistent with the
purpose of the ADEA.24 First, Gilmer argued that Congress designed the
ADEA to address the important social policy of preventing discrimination
against aged employees 5 by allowing both private suits by citizens and
EEOC action against employers. 26 Yet, if ADEA claims may be subject to
compulsory arbitration on an individual basis, Gilmer reasoned, the
EEOC's efforts to enforce the ADEA are undermined and justice will be
14 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
15 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
16 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
17 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
18 See id.
19 See id. at 35.
20 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
21 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
2 2 Id. (citations omitted).
2 3 See id.
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served individually, but not on a wide-scale basis.27 The Court rejected this
argument, noting that arbitration is appropriate for claims under other
federal statutes that also advance broad social goals.28 Additionally, the
Court held that an arbitration agreement would not prevent the EEOC from
filing claims against employers under the ADEA. 29
Second, Gilmer argued that the arbitration of ADEA claims would
deprive claimants of a judicial forum for their grievances. 30 Consistent with
its approach favoring arbitration, the Court dismissed this concern and
noted that "'[i]f Congress intended the substantive protection afforded [by
the ADEA] to include protection against waiver of the right to a judicial
forum, that intention will be deducible from text or legislative history.
'"' 31
The Court disposed of Gilmer's claims that arbitration proceedings did
not provide adequate procedural safeguards, holding that such attacks are
"'far out of step with our current strong endorsement of federal statutes
favoring ... [arbitration]. ' ' 32 Gilmer raised a number of procedural
concerns surrounding arbitration: the arbitration panels may be biased,
discovery is more limited, the arbitrators will not issue written opinions,
judicial review is too limited, arbitration will not provide for broad
equitable relief such as class actions and there often will be unequal
bargaining power between employers and employees under compulsory
arbitration agreements.3 3 The Court rejected the procedural concerns,
finding that under the relevant stock exchange guidelines adequate
protections are in place to address Gilmer's complaints. 34 The Court also
was unfazed by the possible existence of unequal bargaining power, holding
that mere inequality of power is not a sufficient reason to find arbitration
agreements unenforceable.
3 5
The Court also refuted Gilmer's argument that the decisions in
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. and its progeny3 6 prohibit the arbitration
2 7 See Id. at 27-28.
28 See Id. at 28. Other federal statutes listed by the Court where arbitration is
appropriate are the Sherman Act, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organization (RICO) statute and the Securities Act of 1933.
2 9 See Id. at 28, 32.
30 See id. at 28.
31 Id. at 29 (citing Mitsubishi Motor Corp. v. Solar Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985)).
32 rd. at 30 (quoting Rodriguez De Quijas v. ShearsonlAmerican Express, Inc., 490
U.S. 477, 481 (1989)).
33 See id. at 30-33.
34 See id.
35 See id. at 33.
36 Cases applying and interpreting the Court's holding in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver,
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
of discrimination claims.37 The Court did not overturn the Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver line of cases, but construed them so narrowly that they
have little application to mandatory arbitration in the private sector.
Gardner-Denver held that Title VII did not foreclose a union employee from
bringing a claim despite the existence of a collective bargaining common
wage agreement that mandated arbitration.38 Barrantine and McDonald
involved similar claims, and the Court in those cases also held that
collective bargaining agreements would not preclude individual statutory
claims.39 In holding the Gardner-Denver reasoning inapplicable, the Court
noted that those cases did not involve individual agreements to arbitrate
statutory claims, but instead involved the question of judicial resolution of
statutory claims when there was a collective bargaining arbitration
agreement for contract claims. 40 Additionally, the Court noted that
individuals would be represented by unions in the arbitration proceedings;
thus, tension may arise between collective representation and individual
rights. 41 Finally, the Court noted that the cases were not brought under the
FAA, with its broad policy favoring arbitration agreements.42
The Gilmer Court did, not address the question whether the FAA
Section 1 exclusion43 applies to all contracts of employment or only those
contracts involving employees engaged in interstate or foreign commerce. 44
Gilmer's contract with the securities exchanges, not his employment
agreement with Interstate, contained the arbitration clause; thus, the Court
did not reach the issue.45 As a result, the FAA's Section I exclusion is
debated in the lower federal courts, some of which allow the FAA exclusion
to preclude arbitration agreements in all employment contexts and the
majority of which interpret the exclusion narrowly, allowing arbitration
agreements in most employment contracts to be governed under the FAA.46
415 U.S. 36 (1974), include Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728
(1981) and McDonald v. West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
37 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33.
3 8 See id. at 34.





43 Section I of the FAA provides that "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts
of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of yorkers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. 1995).
44 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2.
4 5 
See id.
46 The First, Second, Third, Sixth and Seventh Circuits have all held that the FAA § I
exclusion is limited to workers employed in the transportation industry. See, e.g., Asplundh
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Only two voices, Justices Stevens and Marshall, dissented in Gilmer.
The dissenters felt that the Court was remiss in not addressing the scope of
the FAA Section 1 exclusion.47 They would have broadly construed the
exclusion to encompass all contracts of employment arising out of the
employment relationship. 48 Justice Stevens found that such an interpretation
was consistent with the policies and legislative history of the FAA. 49 Under
the dissent's reading of the FAA, Gilmer's application with the securities
exchange would be arising under the employment relationship with his
employer, Interstate, and thus would be excluded from coverage under the
FAA.50 Further, Justice Stevens argued that Gilmer should not have to
arbitrate his claims under the ADEA because arbitration conflicted with the
social policies under the statute.51 Because commercial arbitration is usually
limited to a specific dispute between individual parties and the available
arbitral remedies do not provide for class-wide injunctive relief, an
"essential purpose of the ADEA is frustrated by compulsory arbitration of
employment discrimination claims." 52
The Gilmer decision heralded the beginning of mandatory arbitration of
civil rights employment claims in the nonunion sector. Employers now had
the Supreme Court's stamp of approval when including pre-dispute
arbitration clauses in their own contracts or in contracts of related
Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592, 596-602 (6th Cir. 1995) (rejecting earlier decision in
Willis v. Dean WIterReynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991) and interpreting legislative
history of FAA to apply the exclusion only to seamen and railroad workers); Hull v. NCR
Corp., 826 F. Supp. 303, 305-307 (E.D. Mo. 1993) (listing Circuits narrowly construing § 1
exclusion). See also Crawford v. West Jersey Health Sys., 847 F. Supp. 1232, 1240-1241
(D.NJ. 1994) (holding that doctor's contract with her employer affected commerce, but that it
was not an employment contract excluded under the FAA). Only a handful of courts interpret
the exclusion clause to exclude all contracts of employment. See, e.g., United Elec. Radio &
Mach. Workers v. Miller Metal Prods., 215 F.2d 221,224 (4th Cir. 1954) (holding that FAA
does not apply to collective bargaining agreements because they were employment contracts
and stating in dicta that it would apply the same rule to all employment contracts); Arce v.
Cotton Club of Greenville, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 117 (N.D. Miss. 1995) (holding that an
arbitration clause that is part of an employment agreement is excluded from the enforcement
power of the FAA and the exclusion clause of 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1994) does not apply to only that
class of employees actually engaged in the movement of goods in foreign or interstate
commerce).
47 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 40 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48 See id.
4 9 See id. at 39-40.
50 See id. at 40.
51 See Id. at 41-42.
52 rd.
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industries, such as the securities application at issue in Gilmer. The decision
is notable for its wide embrace of arbitration of employment claims,
including those involving the civil rights of its claimants.
HIL. AFTER GMER: RESPONSE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
A. Which Civil Rights Claims May Be Arbitrated
The federal courts, on cue from Gilmer, have upheld the use of
mandatory arbitration for a wide range of federal civil rights claims. Courts
have held arbitrable employee claims under Title VII,53 the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA),54 the ADEA,5 5 the Older Workers' Benefits
Protection Act (OWBPA), 5 6 the Employee Retirement and Investment
53 See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lal, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 61 (1995); Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d
1482 (10th Cir. 1994); Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 638 (1994); Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 971 F.2d 698 (1 Ith Cir.
1992); Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1992); Willis v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991); Cherry v. Wertheim Schroder & Co., 868 F. Supp. 830 (D.
S.C. 1994); Crawford v. West Jersey Health Sys., 847 F. Supp. 1232 (D.NJ. 1994);
Williams v. Katten Muchin & Zavis, 837 F. Supp. 1430 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Hull v. NCR
Corp., 826 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Mo. 1993).
54 See, e.g., Golenia v. Bob Baker Toyota, 915 F. Supp. 201 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (holding
that employee's ADA claim was arbitrable); Solomon v. Duke Univ., 850 F. Supp. 372
(M.D.N.C. 1993) (indicating-in dicta that ADA claims would be arbitrable); see also Austin
v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 1103 (W.D. Va. 1994) (upholding
arbitration of union employee ADA claim and applying Gilmer reasoning). But see McGinnis
v. Wonder Chem. Co., No. Civ.A. 95-4384, 1995 WL 756590 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 1995)
(rejecting in dicta arbitration of ADA claim); DiPucclo v. United Parcel Serv., 890 F. Supp.
688 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (rejecting arbitration of union employee ADA claim and applying labor
law precedent); Riley v. Weyerhaeuser Paper Co., 898 F. Supp. 324 (W.D. N.C. 1995)
(rejecting arbitration of union employee ADA claim but applying Gilmer reasoning); Schmidt
v. Safeway, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 991 (D. Or. 1994) (rejecting arbitration of union employee
ADA claim); Block v. Art Iron, Inc., 866 F. Supp. 380 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (same).
55 See generally Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20; Crawford, 847 F. Supp. 1232; Williams v. Cigna
Fin. Advisors, 56 F.3d 656 (5th Cir. 1995).
56 In 1990, the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat.
978 (1990) amended the ADEA at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, 623, 626 and 640. The United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in Williams v. Katten Muchin & Zavis, 837
F. Supp. 1430 (N.D. IIl. 1993), held that OWBPA claims as well as ADEA claims were
arbitrable.
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Security Act (ERISA), 57 the Civil Rights Act of 1991,58 the Employee
Polygraph Protection Act59 and the Protection of Jurors' Employment Act
("Jurors' Act"). 60 The federal courts seemingly have accepted the use of
mandatory arbitration for virtually all private sector employment rights
claims that have come before them; few federal court cases have prohibited
arbitration for a civil rights claim in the nonunion sector.
The widespread acceptance of arbitration for civil rights claims in the
years since Gilmer may be one of the catalysts for the growing criticisms
from certain employment community actors who see no end to the reach of
mandatory arbitration clauses in the civil rights arena. The federal courts,
with few exceptions, are not concerned with potential drawbacks to the use
of mandatory arbitration for civil rights claims. Only in a few recent
decisions have the federal courts shown any interest in curtailing their
endorsement of pre-dispute arbitration.
B. Distrust of Gilmer? Recent Cautionary Decisions
Despite the widespread federal court embrace of mandatory arbitration
for civil rights claims, recently the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit
have shown some caution in their blanket endorsement of mandatory
arbitration clauses. In Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,61 the
Supreme Court upheld an arbitration decision involving a securities claim
that awarded punitive damages to the plaintiff and struck down a choice-of-
law provision in the arbitration contract that would have prevented the
punitive damage award. 62 The decision was a blow to businesses who
employ the tactic of including a New York choice-of-law provision in the
contract boilerplate. Under New York law, punitive damages are not
awardable in arbitrations. The Court's decision, however, rested mainly on
the ambiguous wording in the contract, and the Court did not frown directly
5 7 See, e.g., Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110 (3d
Cir. 1993); Bird v. Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc., 926 F.2d 116 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 501 U.S. 1251 (1991); Bevere v. Oppenheimer & Co., 862 F. Supp. 1243 (D.NJ.
1994).
58 See, e.g., Nghiem v. NEC Elea., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437 (9th Cir. 1994).
59 9 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (1994). See, e.g., Saari v. Smith, Barney, Harris Upham &
Co., 968 F.2d 877 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 506 U.S. 986 (1992).
60 28 U.S.C. § 1875 (1994). See, e.g., McNulty v. Prudentlal-Bache Sec. Inc., 871 F.
Supp. 567 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
61115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995). For a brief discussion of this case, see Henry G. Appel,
Recent Development, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 233 (1996).
6 2 See id.
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upon the security industry's practice of precluding punitive damages. 63 Yet
the decision may indicate that the Court felt that the contracting stage of
mandatory arbitration had gone awry and unduly favored the employer.
Whereas in Gilmer the Court was unconcerned with the potential for
unequal bargaining power,64 Mastrobuono hints that the Court now may be
more concerned with the balance of power between employers and
employees in the drafting and signing of pre-dispute arbitration clauses.
The Ninth Circuit also has exhibited concern for the contracting stage
of the mandatory arbitration process. In Prudential Insurance Co. v. Lai,
65
the court reversed a district court order compelling arbitration in a Title VII
action. The court held that a Title VII plaintiff may be forced to forego
statutory remedies and arbitrate her claim only if she has lnowingly agreed
to submit to arbitration. 66 In Lai, the court found that the plaintiff-
appellants could not have understood they were agreeing to arbitrate sexual
discrimination suits because the securities application form they signed did
not specify the types of suits to be arbitrated. 67
The plaintiff-appellants, Justine Lai and Elvira Viernes, were required
to sign a U-4 form when applying for their positions as sales representatives
for the Prudential Insurance Company of America. 68 The fifth item on page
4 of the form provided: "'I agree to arbitrate any dispute, claim or
controversy that may arise between me or my firm... that is required to be
arbitrated under the rules, constitutions or bylaws of the organizations with
which I register."'69 The disputes which must be arbitrated were found in
the cross-referenced rules of the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD), the securities organization Lai and Viernes joined. The NASD
manual's arbitration requirements, in turn, provided: "'Any dispute, claim,
or controversy ... between or among members ... arising in connection
with the business of such member(s) ... shall be arbitrated."' 70 The Ninth
Circuit found that the plaintiff-appellants could not have understood that
they were agreeing to arbitrate sexual discrimination suits when they signed
the U-4 form because neither that form nor the NASD manual referred to
employment disputes.
71
63 See id. at 1216.
64 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33.
65 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994).
66 See id.
67 See id. at 1305.
68 See id. at 1301.
69 Id. at 1302 (emphasis added).
7 0 See id. at 1301-1302 (quoting NASD MANUAL, CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE
3708).
71 Id. at 1305.
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The Lai decision indicates that the Ninth Circuit is concerned with
notice of waiving statutory rights at the contracting stage. According to the
court, appropriate notice would require explicit contractual notice that
employees were waiving their rights to a judicial forum for employment
disputes.
72
Although it may be too early to tell what impact, if any, Mastrobuono
and Lai will have, the decisions may indicate a shift in the federal court
thinking regarding the contracting stage of pre-dispute arbitration clauses.
Significantly, these cases mark the first time since Gilmer that a federal
court has struck down an arbitration agreement in the private nonunion
sector because of issues surrounding the mandatory arbitration contract
itself.
73
C. Federal Court Review of Arbitration Decisions Involving Civil
Rights Claims
Except for the decisions in Mastrobuono and Lai, the federal courts
have not been willing to address any of the inequalities or problems inherent
in mandatory arbitration in nonunion civil rights claims as they exist at
either the contracting or procedural stages of mandatory arbitration. The
courts, but for a single instance, also have not used their powers of review
to correct inequitable arbitration awards involving civil rights claims.
74
The limited scope of authority federal courts have for reviewing arbitral
awards may account for the dearth of cases where courts have reviewed such
cases. The limited scope of authority federal courts have for reviewing
arbitral awards. Congress has limited the grounds upon which an arbitral
award can be vacated. A court only may vacate an award (1) where the
award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means; (2) where there
was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3)
where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
72 See Id.
73 In a more recent non-employment case, the Ninth Circuit again expressed concern
over the proper notice at the contracting stage of mandatory arbitration. In Graham Oil v.
ARCO Products, 43 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 275 (1995), the court held
that an arbitration agreement in a commercial suit involving the purported waiver of statutory
rights under the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act (PMPA) was an unenforceable contract of
adhesion. Although Graham Oil did not involve civil rights of employees, it does suggest a
trend in the Ninth Circuit of providing greater protection of "notice" when signing pre-dispute
arbitration agreements. But cf. Golenia v. Bob Baker Toyota, 915 F. Supp. 201 (S.D. Cal.
1996) (holding that an "adhesion contract" objection to an arbitration clause in an employment
contract was inconsistent with the strong federal policy favoring arbitration).
74 See generally Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. 1212.
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hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy or of any other misbehavior by
which the rights of the parties have been prejudiced; or (4) where the
arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a
mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made. 75 Federal precedent also echoes the policy of limited judicial review
of arbitral awards.
76
The limited scope of judicial review constrains the federal courts in
their efforts to police inequitable arbitral awards involving civil rights
claims, but the power of review still remains as a potential weapon against
egregious violations of arbitral power. At present, however, this potential
weapon lies dormant in the federal court arsenal. To date, a federal court
has reviewed for procedural fairness issues an arbitration decision involving
a nonunion civil rights claim only once, 77 in Olson v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith.
78
The Eighth Circuit in Olson struck down the arbitration decision
because of partiality of the arbitrators.79 In Olson, an employee sued his
employer for age discrimination and a panel of three arbitrators rendered a
decision in favor of the employer.80 Olson moved to vacate the decision
under 9 U.S.C. Section 10(a)(2),8 1 alleging that the arbitrators were not
impartial because two of the arbitrators had failed to disclose ongoing
business relationships with the defendant-employer.8 2 The district court
denied the motion and confirmed the arbitration.83 The Eighth Circuit
reversed, holding that one arbitrator's failure to disclose his high ranking
position with a corporation that had a close business relationship with the
75 See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1994).
76 See, e.g., Remmey v. Paine Webber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143 (4th Cir. 1994), cerr. denied,
115 S. Ct. 903 (1995).
77 The federal courts have reviewed other arbitration decisions involving civil rights
claims, but these cases were not reviewed for procedural fairness of the arbitration under 9
U.S.C. § 10(a). See generally Nghlem, 25 F.3d at 1437 (upholding an arbitration award
involving a Title VH claim because plaintiff's voluntary initiation of arbitration constituted
waiver of objection of authority of arbitrator); Solomon v. Duke Univ.. 850 F. Supp. 372
(M.D.N.C. 1993) (upholding an arbitration award involving ADA claim because plaintiff had
not timely filed a motion to vacate the award).
79 51 F.3d 157 (8th Cir. 1995).
7 9 See id. at 157.
80 See id. at 158.
81 Under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (1994), a court may vacate an arbitration award if 'there
was evident partiality ... in the arbitrators."
82 See Olson, 51 F.3d at 158.
83 See id.
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defendant, Merrill Lynch, required the vacation of the arbitration award. 84
The Eighth Circuit's single reversal of the arbitration award involving a
civil rights claim does not by itself provide enough of a pattern to draw any
conclusion regarding a federal court trend in reviewing arbitrated civil
rights claims. It may be significant to note, however, that in other non-civil
rights federal court decisions involving alleged arbitrator partiality, the
courts denied motions to vacate arbitration awards. 85 In Flume and Johnston
Lemon, the courts seemed less concerned with the same type of arbitrator
partiality that was worthy of reversal in Olson. In Flume, one of the
arbitrators bad a business relationship with one of the arbitral parties, the
defendant-stockbroker. 86 Five or six years before the arbitration, the
arbitrator had purchased stock through the broker.87 The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, however, held that the
arbitrator's business dealings were insufficiently "intimate" to show
partiality.88 Similarly, in Johnston Lemon, one of the arbitrators failed to
disclose a significant past adversarial relationship between his former
employer and the defendant-broker. 89 Although the arbitrator had retired
from the company by the time the dispute arose between his former
employer and the defendant-broker, the plaintiffs had no notice of that fact
because the arbitrator belatedly had filed the National Association of
Securities Dealers form.9° Nevertheless, the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia held that this was not evidence of arbitrator
partiality because the broker, who was appealing the case, ostensibly had
notice oik the arbitrator's relationship with his former employer from the
available forms filed by the arbitrator and, thus, should have objected
84 See id.
85 See, e.g., Remmey v. Paine Webber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143 (4th Cir. 1994) (affirming
arbitration award and rejecting claims of bias of arbitrators, manifest disregard of the law and
violation of public policy), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 903 (1995); Hayne, Miller & Farni, Inc.
v. Flume, 888 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Wis. 1995) (denying motion to vacate arbitration award
based on arbitrators' prejudice, exceeding their authority and arbitration not supported by
evidence); Johnston Lemon & Co. v. Smith, 886 F. Supp. 54 (D.D.C. 1995) (denying motion
to vacate arbitration award based on claims of arbitrators exceeding their powers, manifestly
disregarding the law and bias); Smith v. Prudential See., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 978 (M.D. Fla.
1994) (denying motion to vacate arbitration award based on claims of arbitrators' partiality,
misconduct and imperfectly executing powers).
86 See Flume, 888 F. Supp. at 958-959.
87 Se, Id.
88 Se, Id.
89 See Johnston Liemon, 886 F. Supp. at 56.
90 See id.
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earlier. 91
The fact that the Olson court reversed for arbitrator partiality and two
federal courts faced with similar, albeit non-civil rights, circumstances did
not vacate the arbitration award may not be significant; indeed, the Olson
court did not indicate that its decision was colored by the type of claim
brought by the plaintiff. The Eighth Circuit's decision in Olson, however,
may indicate that federal courts in the future will more carefully scrutinize
arbitration awards when they involve civil rights claims.
IV. AFTER GILMER: THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
A. Legislative Histories Discouraging Mandatory Arbitration and
Relevant Case Law
1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
The Gilmer Court held that statutory claims may be arbitrated unless
Congress intended, through the legislative history or in the text of the
statute itself, that certain rights may not be precluded from judicial
adjudication.92 Two recent federal statutes-the ADA and the 1991 Civil
Rights Act-contain language in their respective legislative histories that
would seem to preclude mandatory arbitration.
The legislative history of the ADA indicates that nonvoluntary
arbitration is not a desirable means of enforcing rights under the Act. A
1990 House Conference Report states:
It is the intent of the conferees that the use of [these] alternative
dispute resolution procedures is completely voluntary. Under no
condition would an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining
agreement or employment contract prevent an individual from
pursuing their rights under the ADA. 93
A Committee Print prepared for the House Committee on Education
and Labor echoes the same sentiments regarding mandatory arbitration:
91 See id.
92 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
93 H.R. CONF. Rm,. No. 101-596, 101ST CONG. (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 565, 598 (emphasis added).
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The Committee wishes to emphasize ... that the use of alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms is intended to supplement, not
supplant, the remedies provided by this Act. Thus, for example, the
Committee believes that any agreement to submit disputed issues to
arbitration, whether in the context of a collective bargaining
agreement or in an employment contract does not preclude the
affected person from seeking relief under the enforcement provisions
of the Act .... The Committee believes that the approach articulated
by the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. applies
equally to the ADA and does not intend that [this section] be used to
preclude rights and remedies otherwise available to persons with
disabilities.
94
The legislative history of the ADA apparently mandates that any
agreement to arbitrate disputes under the ADA must be voluntary and
should not preclude a claimant's rights to a judicial forum. By definition,
mandatory arbitration is a pre-dispute agreement that would preclude the
claimant from seeking relief in court and may not be voluntary because the
contract is signed in advance of any dispute under the ADA. Congress,
then, arguably intended in the legislative history to preclude mandatory
arbitration for claims brought under the ADA.
At least two federal courts faced with nonunion ADA claims, however,
have eschewed the legislative history of the ADA and held that ADA claims
may be submitted to arbitration under a pre-dispute arbitration agreement.
In Solomon v. Duke University,95 the United States District Court for the
Middle District of North Carolina confirmed an arbitration award against a
plaintiff alleging ADA violations. The court did not discuss in detail its
analysis regarding Ms. Solomon's ADA claim because she did not bring a
timely challenge to the arbitration under the FAA. 96 The court, however,
stated in dicta that Ms. Solomon's argument that the arbitrator could not
hear her ADA claim was "without merit." 97 The Solomon court apparently
would have allowed the arbitrators to hear Ms. Solomon's ADA claim
despite the legislative history discouraging pre-dispute arbitration for such
claims.
A more recent district court case, however, is more troublesome in
light of the ADA's legislative history discouraging nonvoluntary arbitration
94 HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 101ST CONG., LacisLArivE HISTORY OF
PUBLIC LAW 101-336, THE AMERICANS WITH DIsABILrTIEs ACT 516-517 (Comm. Print 1990)
(emphasis added).
95 850 F. Supp. 372 (M.D.N.C. 1993).
96 See id. at 373.
97id.
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because it allows arbitration of ADA claims based on the text of the ADA
without considering the legislative history in forming the statute. In Golenia
v. Bob Baker Toyota,98 Judge Jones of the United States District Court for
the Southern District of California held that the plaintiffs ADA claim was
arbitrable because the text of the ADA "betrays no indication of special
hostility to arbitration" and even encourages arbitration. 99 The court did not
follow the Gilmer Court suggestion to consider both the text and legislative
history of the statutes and relied solely on the text to inform its decision.
The court then compared ADA claims with claims brought under Title VII
and found that because the statutes were similar in aim and substantive
provisions, and because Title VII claims were arbitrable in the Ninth
Circuit, ADA claims similarly were arbitrable. 100
At the present time, the Solomon and Golenia courts are the only
federal courts that have addressed the issue of arbitration of ADA claims in
the nonunion sector. Although it remains to be seen how subsequent federal
courts will treat such claims in the same context, the burgeoning trend is
disturbing. The Solomon court addressed the issue in dicta and without
discussion of the ADA legislative history. Similarly, the Golenia court
ignored the ADA's legislative history and looked only to the ADA's literal
text. Apparently the Congressional effort to discourage nonvoluntary
arbitration by preserving such sentiment in the public record accompanying
the statute is failing to persuade the federal courts, at least in the ADA
context.
There is more case law in the federal courts regarding ADA claims
brought by union employees faced with a collective bargaining agreement
(CBA), yet in those cases the federal courts seem to be struggling to
interpret Gilmer and the relevance of the ADA's legislative history.
Although this Article focuses on nonunion private employee civil rights, a
brief overview of case law involving arbitration of ADA civil rights claims
of union employees will be helpful to illustrate the disarray and confusion in
the federal courts after Gilmer.
A number of recent federal cases have held that ADA claims brought by
union employees faced with a collective bargaining agreement mandating
arbitration of employee claims are precluded from arbitration and may
proceed through the judicial process. 10 1 The courts in all of these cases
98 915 F. Supp. 201 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
99 See id. at 205.
100 Id.
101 See, e.g., McGinnis v. Wonder Chem. Co., No. Civ.A. 95-4384. 1995 WL 756590
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 1995); DiPuccio v. United Parcel Serv., 890 F. Supp. 688 (N.D. Ohio
1995); Schmidt v. Safeway, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 991 (D. Or. 1994). Block v. Art Iron, Inc..
866 F. Supp. 380 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
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relied on the collective labor line of cases beginning with Alexander v.
Gardner-Denvert °2 instead of the Gilmer reasoning to preclude arbitration
of the ADA claims. The courts specifically distinguished the Gilmer
precedent from the collective bargaining precedents:
Gilmer and the other cases ... are distinguishable. In Gibner, the
Supreme Court distinguished the plaintiff's contract, a New York Stock
Exchange Registration Application, from collective bargaining agreements
in which parties had not specifically agreed to arbitrate their statutory
claims. It was significant to the Court that the circumstances of Gibner did
not involve any tension between collective representation and individual
statutory rights.
10 3
There is nothing in Gibner to suggest that the [Supreme] [C]ourt
abandoned or even reconsidered its efforts to protect individual statutory
rights from the give-and-take of the collective bargaining process. It is
true, of course, that Gibner permits employees individually to enter
contracts under which they agree to submit statutory claims to arbitration.
... But the court went out of its way in Gilmer to contrast its holding in
that case with its holdings in Gardner-Denver, Barrentine, and McDonald
.... Consequently, Gilmer does not alter or undermine the protection
established in Gardner-Denver against waiver of individual statutory
rights through collective bargaining agreements. 104
Thus, in the majority of cases where the federal courts have prevented
arbitration of union employees' ADA claims, the courts have relied on the
Gardner-Denver line of cases rather than the Gilmer reasoning.
Two cases involving union employees' ADA claims, however, do not
rely on the Gardner-Denver reasoning but instead rely on the Gilmer
rationale. Although the cases both apply Gilmer to the issue, they reach
different conclusions. In Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container,
Inc.,105 the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia
held that claims under the ADA are subject to mandatory arbitration. The
Austin court granted summary judgment to the defendant-employer because
the union employee did not arbitrate her claims. 16 The court did not discuss
the rationale behind its decision, but simply held that "because plaintiff's
[ADA] complaint was subject to mandatory arbitration, the Gilmer line of
102415 U.s. 36 (1974).
103 DiPuccio, 890 F. Supp. at 692.
104 Block, 866 F. Supp. at 386 (citations omitted).
105 844 F. Supp. 1103 (W.D. Va. 1994).
106 See id. at 1106.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
cases applies here." 10 7 The court's simple statement without more has led
other courts to criticize the Austin court's reasoning. 108
In contrast, in Riley v. Weyerhaeuser Paper Co.,10 the court applied
the Gilmer reasoning but came to the opposite result: ADA claims may not
be arbitrated. The Riley court looked to the legislative history of the ADA,
as it interpreted Gilmer to require, and determined that it was "unequivocal
in expressing Congress' intent to preclude a waiver ofjudicial remedies." 110
Thus, the court found that the claimant could pursue judicial remedies for
his ADA claim.
As the preceding discussion makes clear, there are inconsistencies
among the federal courts in their application of Gilmer to cases involving
the arbitration of union employees' statutory rights. The most correct
interpretation of Gilmer would be to preclude union cases involving
collective bargaining agreements from applying a Gilmer-type analysis. As
DiPuccio and Block assert, the Gilmer Court did not intend for its analysis
in Gilmer to apply to collective bargaining agreements. Instead, it
distinguished the Gardner-Denver line of cases from the case at bar. Thus,
cases involving ADA claims in the union sector should rely on Gardner-
Denver, which is still good law, and should allow statutory civil rights
claims to proceed in a judicial forum.
Similarly, the most correct approach for courts facing cases involving
ADA claims in the private sector would be to examine the ADA's
legislative history, which precludes nonvoluntary arbitration, and not allow
mandatory arbitration of ADA claims. Although the only two federal courts
considering nonunion ADA cases did not take such an approach, other
federal courts should reject the cursory analysis of Solomon and Golenia
and adhere to the legislative history of the ADA, which clearly rejects
nonvoluntary arbitration.
2. The Civil Rights Act of 1991
Just as the ADA's legislative history precludes mandatory arbitration,
the Civil Rights Act of 1991's legislative history similarly discourages
mandatory arbitration and directly rejects the application of the Gilmer
reasoning. In remarks to the Senate in October of 1991, Senator Dole stated
107 Id. at 1107.
108 See, e.g., DiPuccio, 890 F. Supp. at 692 (stating that the Austin court failed to
discuss the distinction between the collective representation and individual statutory rights);
Block, 866 F. Supp. at 385 (stating that the Austin court was in conflict with clear and
controlling Supreme Court precedent in Gilmer).
109 898 F. Supp. 324 (W.D.N.C. 1995).
1 0 Id. at 326.
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that this provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 "encourages the use of
alternative means of dispute resolution, including binding arbitration, where
the parties knowingly and voluntarily elect to use these methods."111
In November of 1991, Senator Edwards addressed the House on the
dispute resolution of Civil Rights Act of 1991 claims, remarking:
[The ADR provision of the Act] is intended to supplement, not supplant,
remedies provided by Title VII, and is not to be used to preclude rights
and remedies that would otherwise be available. This section is intended
to be consistent with decisions such as Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.
which protect employees from being required to agree in advance to
arbitrate disputes under Title VII and to refrain from exercising their right
to seek relief under Title VII itself. This section contemplates the use of
voluntary arbitration to resolve specific disputes after they have arisen,
not coercive attempts to force employees in advance to forego statutory
rights. No approval whatsoever is intended of the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Gilbert (sic) v. Interstate Johnson Lane Corp. or any
application or extensions of it to Title V.1 12
A House Conference Report to the Judiciary Committee on the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 includes language similar to Senator Edwards'
statements on the House floor.113 The Committee emphdsized that any
agreement to submit disputes to arbitration does not preclude the party from
seeking relief under the Act's enforcement provisions.1
14
The legislative history of the 1991 Act seems unequivocal: Mandatory
pre-dispute arbitration is not permitted for enforcing the statute's
protections. The Ninth Circuit's handling of two cases involving Title VII
claims brought under the 1991 amendments, however, illustrates both the
effectiveness of the legislative language discouraging mandatory arbitration
and the hesitancy of the Ninth Circuit in interpreting that legislative
language. In the first case, Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., the Ninth Circuit
upheld the arbitration of Title VII claims because the plaintiff had not rai§ed
legislative history arguments but had relied instead on a weak textual
argument to which the court did not give credence. 115 Later that same year,
111 137 CoNG. REc. S15472, S15478 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Dole)
(emphasis added).
112 137 CONG. REC. H9505, H9530 (daily ed. Nov. 7. 1991) (statement of Sen.
Edwards) (emphasis added).
113 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 10240 pt. 2, at 41 (1991).
114 Id.
115 Nghien, 25 F.3d at 1441.
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however, the Ninth Circuit decided Prudential Insurance Co. v. Lai.116 In
that case, the court expressly interpreted the legislative history of the 1991
Act to prevent arbitration of Title VII claims unless the plaintiffs knowingly
and voluntarily signed arbitration agreements.
117
In Nghiem, the plaintiff, Peter Nghiem, contested the validity of an
arbitration decision rendered against him. Regarding his Title VII claim,
Nghiem argued that his employment discrimination claim must be
adjudicated in federal court because although the Gilmer decision
anticipated that Title VH claims would be arbitrable, the 1991 amendments
to Title VII provide for a jury trial and thus necessarily preclude arbitration
of such claims. 118 Nghiem did not rely in his argument on the relevant
legislative history of Title VII or the 1991 Act. Instead, Nghiem relied
solely on the text of the 1991 amendments presumably to make the argument
of exclusion: If the text provides for a jury trial, then it excludes arbitration
that prevents ajudicial forum.1
19
The Ninth Circuit, led by Judge O'Scannlain, rejected Nghiem's
argument, stating simply:
[E]stablishing a right to jury trial for Title VII claims does not evince a
congressional intent to preclude arbitration; it merely defines those
procedures which are available to plaintiffs who pursue the federal option,
as opposed to arbitration.
120
Nghiem indicates the Ninth Circuit's initial hesitancy to apply the
legislative history of the 1991 Act, at least if the plaintiff does not raise
such an argument. Indeed, the court acknowledged that the test of whether a
statutory claim may be arbitrated is one of "congressional intent," but noted
that Nghiem did not argue that Congress "intended to exclude Title VII
claims from arbitration." 121 Those cryptic words suggest that if Nghiem had
made a legislative intent argument, the Ninth Circuit may have considered
it.
Although the Ninth Circuit in Nghiem avoided examination of the 1991
Act's legislative history, the court in Lai not only examined that history but
also relied on it to hold that the plaintiff-appellant's claims were not
arbitrable because they had not knowingly and voluntarily signed an
116 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994).
117 See id. at 1305.
118 See Nghiem, 25 F.3d at 1437.
119 See id.
120 id.
121 Id. (emphasis added).
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arbitration agreement. 122 In Lai, two plaintiff-appellants sought on appeal to
reverse a district court order compelling them to arbitrate their Title VII
claims against their employer. 123 The plaintiff-appellants had signed a
general form requiring them to arbitrate all claims arising under their
security employer's registering organization. 124 The defendant employer
subsequently sought to compel arbitration of plaintiffs' sexual harassment
claims. Judge Schroeder reviewed the legislative history of the 1991 Act
and cited a statement by Senator Dole, who remarked that the statute
encourages arbitration "only 'where the parties knowingly and voluntarily
elect to use these methods.' '125 Because the forms signed by the appellants
did not describe the types of suits to be arbitrated, and did not even refer to
employment disputes per se, the court held that the claimants need not
arbitrate their claims because they had not knowingly agreed to submit their
disputes to arbitration. 126 Thus, the Lai court made use of the 1991 Act's
legislative history to denounce the employer's tactics in unilaterally
enforcing arbitration of all employment claims.
In sum, the Congressional indication in the legislative history of recent
civil rights statutes that the enforcement of such claims should not occur by
mandatory arbitration has had mixed results as the federal courts struggle to
apply Gilmer and interpret the history of each statute. The legislative
histories of the ADA and the 1991 Civil Rights Act plainly reject
mandatory, nonvoluntary arbitration. The federal courts interpreting the
ADA, however, have not always acted consistently with the legislative
mandate. The two federal courts that have considered nonunion ADA claims
that were bound by mandatory arbitration agreements have indicated that
they favor arbitration. Other federal courts considering union ADA claims
have divided on whether they will apply the Gilmer or Gardner-Denver
precedents and have likewise split on whether they will enforce mandatory
arbitration of civil rights claims. In contrast, at least one federal court, the
Ninth Circuit, has interpreted the legislative history of the 1991 Civil
Rights Act to prohibit nonvoluntary arbitration of statutory claims.
B. Proposed Congressional Bills
Rather than rely on the courts' interpretations of the legislative history
behind civil rights statutes, some members of Congress have proposed a
more direct response to Gilmer's endorsement of mandatory arbitration that
12 2 See Lai, 42 F.3d at 1305.
123 See id. at 1301.
124 Se, id.
125 rd. at 1305.
126 See id.
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can not be as easily manipulated by the courts. Two Congressional
companion bills seek to directly amend seven federal civil rights laws to
provide that the protections and procedures of the laws can not be
overridden by contract, other federal statutes of general applicability or by
any other means. 127 The bills would still allow employees to voluntarily
submit their discrimination claims to arbitration.
In August of 1994, Senator Feingold and Representatives Schroeder,
Markey and Margolies-Mezvinsky introduced Senate Bill 2405128 and its
companion bill, House of Representatives Bill 4981. The bills are known by
their common popular name, the Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of
1994. The bills would amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
ADEA, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the ADA, Section 1977 of the
Revised Statutes, the Equal Pay Requirement under the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993.129 According
to the bill, each of the named civil rights statutes would be amended by
adding a provision that reads:
EXCLUSIVITY OF POWERS AND PROCEDURES
Notwithstanding any Federal statute of general applicability that
would modify any of the procedures expressly applicable to a claim
arising under this Act, such powers and procedures shall be the
exclusive powers and procedures applicable to such right or such
claim unless after such right or such claim arises the claimant
voluntarily enters into an agreement to resolve such right or such
claim through arbitration or other procedure.
130
According to its authors, the proposed legislation reverses Gilmer and
"closes a widening loophole in the enforcement of civil rights laws." 131
Reports about the absence of effective remedies for sexual harassment in the
securities industry and a General Accounting Office report documenting
flaws in the arbitration system for securities industry employees also
spurred creation of the bill. 132 Representative Markey emphasized that the
127 See S. 2405, 103d Cong. (1994); H.R. 4981, 103d Cong. (1994).
128 Senator Feingold earlier had sponsored a bill with the same goals as S. 2405; the
earlier short title, however, is more descriptive. The bill, S. 2012, 103d Cong. (1994), was
known as the "Protection from Coercive Employment Agreements Act."
129 See S. 2405, 103d Cong. § 1 (1994).
130 Id. at § 2 (emphasis added).
131 Discrimination: Senate Bill Bars Mandatory EEO Arbitration, Empl. Pal. & L.
Daily, August 22, 1994, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNA-ELD File, at dS.
132 Discrimination: House Democrats Introduce Bill to Bar Compulsory Arbitration of
Bias Claims, Empl. Pol. & L. Daily, August 19, 1994, available in LEXIS, BNA Library,
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GAO found that arbitrators in the securities industry are predominantly
white men who average 60 years of age and remarked that "such arbitrators
are unlikely to appreciate the problems faced by women and minorities
compelled to bring their discrimination claims to arbitration."
1 33
The bills have been referred to the Senate Labor and Human Resources
Committee and the House Judiciary and Education and Labor Committees,
respectively. However, at least one of its authors is skeptical of the bills'
passage in a Republican-controlled Congress. Representative Markey
commented, "Christians had a better chance against the lions than many
investors and employees will have in the climate being created."
134
There have been other legislative measures discouraging mandatory
arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism. An earlier 1994 proposed bill
also indicates, albeit in a more oblique fashion, that arbitration is not the
preferred form of dispute resolution for civil rights claims. 135 In July of
1994 by Senator Danforth introduced Senate Bill S. 2327, commonly
known as the Employment Dispute Resolution Act of 1994.136 The bill
proposes to amend Title VII, the ADA and Section 1977 of the Revised
Statutes to encourage mediation of complaints filed under those statutes.
137
Significantly, the bill speaks exclusively of mediation of civil rights claims
brought under those statutes and does not mention arbitration or mandatory
arbitration. The absence of any mention of arbitration suggests that the
bill's sponsors felt that mediation rather than arbitration was the most
desirable form of ADR for civil rights claims.
In sum, the Congressional response to Gilmer and the rise of mandatory
arbitration contracts has been to focus on the contracting stage, essentially
prohibiting the use of mandatory arbitration contracts altogether and instead
emphasizing voluntary forms of dispute resolution. While recent 1990s civil
rights statutes, notably the ADA and the 1991 Civil Rights Act, discouraged
mandatory arbitration in their legislative histories, more recent legislative
efforts symbolize the concern of some Congressional members that many
civil rights statutes do not contain language in their legislative histories
discouraging arbitration and, of those that do, the implicit Congressional
intent may be eschewed by the courts. Congressional members, then, seek
BNA-ELD File, at dl0.
133 Id.
134 Margaret A. Jacobs & Michael Siconolfi, Losing Barles, WAil. ST. J., Feb. 8,
1995, at Al.
135 See S. 2327, 103d Cong. (1994).
136 A companion House bill, H.R. 2016, 103d Cong. (1993), was introduced on May 6,
1993 by Representative Gunderson. The House bill was referred to the House Committees on
Education and Labor and Judiciary.
13 7 See S. 2327, 103d Cong. (1994).
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to attack directly the rise of mandatory arbitration by amending the text of a
number of civil rights statutes to prohibit mandatory arbitration.
However, in a Republican-majority Congress, efforts to directly amend
civil rights statutes to prohibit arbitration contracts are unlikely to pass, and
the bills probably will remain shelved in their respective committees. More
realistically, federal courts will continue to apply the Gilmer rule of
interpreting the congressional intent towards mandatory arbitration in the
legislative histories of civil rights statutes. Because most of the civil rights
statutes do not directly discourage mandatory arbitration in their legislative
histories, it is likely that federal courts will continue to allow mandatory
arbitration of such claims under Gilmer.
V. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION:
CONCERN AT THE CONTRACTING STAGE
Like Congress, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) focuses its response to Gilmer on the contracting stage of
arbitration and attempts to ensure that mandatory arbitration contracts are
not created or enforced. In a policy statement issued in July of 1995, the
EEOC discussed features essential to any use of ADR under EEOC
auspices, including use of ADR in such programs as charge processing,
litigation, federal sector equal employment opportunity complaint
processing, labor-management relations and contract administration. 138 One
of the core features of the EEOC's own ADR policy is voluntariness. In
thai regard, the statement reads:
ADR programs developed by the Commission will be voluntary for
the parties because the unique importance of the laws against
employment discrimination requires that a federal forum always be
available to an aggrieved individual. The Commission believes that
parties must knowingly, willingly, and voluntarily enter into an ADR
proceeding.139
The EEOC, then, favors only voluntary rather than mandatory
arbitration as an acceptable form of ADR for use by the Commission. The
EEOC holds the business community to similar standards and frowns upon
the use of mandatory arbitration in private employers' internal ADR
programs. 140 In a March 1995 Task Force Report on Dispute Resolution,
138 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Notice 915.002, Alternative Dispute
Resolution Policy Statement (July 17, 1995).
13 9 Id. (emphasis added).
140 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Report of the Task Force on
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the Commission stated:
Despite our support for employer-sponsored ADR, we are concerned
that some employers may attempt to require employees to engage in
ADR prior to seeking the assistance of the Commission. We caution
employers that internal resolution programs cannot supplant the
remedies afforded by the civil rights laws. Alleged victims of
employment discrimination should be able to file charges with the
EEOC, regardless of the outcome of any employer-sponsored
resolution program. The Commission should reiterate its long-
standing opposition to pre-employment agreements that mandate
binding arbitration of employment discrimination disputes.
141
A recent EEOC case against a Texas business further illustrates the
EEOC's distrust of private employers' mandatory arbitration policies. In
EEOC v. River Oaks Imaging and Diagnostic,142 the EEOC sought a
temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction against a large
outpatient imaging and diagnostic center, River Oaks Imaging and
Diagnostic (ROID). The EEOC alleged that the business's "ADR Policy"
was so misleading and against the principles of Title VII that it violated the
law. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
granted the preliminary injunction in April of 1995.143 The ease has since
been settled, 144 but the EEOC's arguments regarding ROID's practice of
compulsory arbitration are illustrative of the EEOC's policy regarding
mandatory arbitration.
The EEOC alleged that ROID's mandatory ADR policy forced
employees involuntarily to relinquish their Title VII remedies because
evidence indicated that ROID implemented the policy with the intent of
retaliating and terminating employees who had filed discrimination charges
against it. 145 ROID had forced all employees to "agree" to arbitrate disputes
after seventeen employees had brought charges of sexual discrimination
Alternative Dispute Resolution 26 (March 1995) [hereinafter EEOC Report].
141Id.
142 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1243, 1995 WiL 264003 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 19,
1995).
143 See id.
144 Telephone Interview with Sharona Hoffman, Senior Trial Attorney, United States
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Houston District Office (October 20, 1995).
145 Amended Memorandum of Law in Support of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 2,
EEOC v. River Oaks Imaging and Diagnostic, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1243, 1995
WL 264003 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 1995).
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against ROID with the EEOC. Employees were forced to sign the policy
without consulting with a lawyer or they were immediately discharged.
146
Furthermore, the EEOC alleged that ROID employees were unaware that
they may lose the right to file suit premised on a Title VII claim if they
utilized arbitration before filing a charge with the EEOC because ROID's
ADR Policy was silent regarding the waiver of charge filing and private suit
rights. 147 Finally, the EEOC alleged that "[c]oercive regimens such as
ROD's... do not comport with the statutory expectations" of the 1991
Civil Rights Act. 148 In its Memorandum in Support of Preliminary
Injunction, the EEOC reviewed the legislative history of the 1991 Civil
Rights Act and concluded that Congress intended to encourage only
voluntary alternative dispute mechanisms for claims brought under the
Act.149
The EEOC discourages all forms of mandatory arbitration for current
or prospective employees. Critical components of any arbitration program,
according to the EEOC, are the voluntary participation of both actors to the
agreement as well as certain procedural safeguards that ensure the
employee's voluntary participation including the opportunity for the
employee to consult an attorney before signing the agreement and a
statement that explains what rights the employee relinquishes by signing it.
Still, employers may query: what does the EEOC's position on
mandatory arbitration mean to private businesses who contemplate the use
of such programs for resolving employee discrimination claims? Because a
recent General Accounting Office survey indicated that virtually all private
employers use some type of internal alternative dispute resolution
mechanism to resolve disputes, 150 the answer is of great importance to
private employers. The answer, however, is not entirely clear. On the one
hand, companies may feasibly interpret the River Oaks Imaging and
Diagnostic case as an extreme abuse of mandatory arbitration policies and,
as such, would not apply as precedent to any subsequent or concurrent
private corporate attempt to use mandatory arbitration in a more reasonable
fashion. Yet, as noted above, the Commission's recent comments in its
March 1995 report indicate that it discourages the use of mandatory
arbitration as an internal dispute mechanism.
151
146 See id.
147 See id. at 8-9.
148 Id. at 22.
149 See id. at 22-23.
150 See Discrimination: Nearly All Private Employers Use ADR to Resolve Bias
Disputes, GAO Study Finds, Empl. Pol. & L. Daily, July 7, 1995, available in LEXIS, BNA
Library, BNA-ELD File, at d4.
151 See EEOC Report, supra note 140.
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Risk-averse employers would be wise to avoid mandatory arbitration as
a component of an internal ADR system for the time being and opt instead
for programs of mediation or voluntary arbitration. More entrepreneurial
companies, however, may seek to employ mandatory arbitration albeit with
increased safeguards and standards that address the EEOC's concerns. Such
programs may pass muster under the EEOC. For example, the Commission
especially was concerned that alleged employment discrimination victims
would not be able to file charges with the EEOC if employers used
mandatory arbitration. A progressive mandatory arbitration policy would
ensure that employees who signed the agreement were informed at the time
of signing (and perhaps at the time of the arbitration filing) of the
concomitant EEOC charge rights and procedures that the employee was
foregoing by using mandatory arbitration. With such a safeguard, the
alleged victim's recourse with the EEOC would not be compromised and
the arbitration agreement, though pre-dispute, would become more
"voluntary." Further safeguards may be implemented at the contracting
stage as discussed in Part VII(B)(1), of this paper.
VI. PRIVATE ADR PROVIDERS: PROCEDURAL FAIRNEss ISSUES
In contrast to the Congressional and EEOC focus on the contracting
stage, the two principle ADR providers, JAMS/Endispute 52 and the
American Arbitration Association (AAA), 153 have focused their responses
to the rapid growth of mandatory arbitration after Gilmer on improving the
procedures surrounding the arbitration process.
In December of 1994, JAMS/Endispute issued a policy statement
outlining minimum standards of fairness for arbitration policies. 154 The
policy statement was drafted in reaction to the concern over "company-
152 In June 1994, Endispute, Inc. merged with Judicial Arbitration and Mediation
Services, Inc. (JAMS) and Bates Edward Group to form the present company,
JAMSlEndispute. The corporation is a national full service alternative dispute resolution
provider offering all types of dispute resolution services, including case evaluation, mediated
discovery, mediation, arbitration, facilitation, consensus building and training seminars.
JAMSlEndispute employs 300 ADR specialists and has offices in more than 30 cities. Last
year, the corporation handled more than 16,000 ADR proceedings. See JAMS/ENDISPUTE,
INTRODUCING JAMSIENDISPUTE (corporate brochure) (1995).
153 The AAA is a seventy year-old, not-for-profit public service organization based in
New York. It is the largest provider of private dispute resolution. Last year, the AAA handled
over 60,000 dispute resolution cases. Twenty-five percent of the cases were labor arbitrations.
See AAA General Counsel Discusses Nonunion Employment Disputes, supra note 4.
154 See JAMS/Endispute Issues Minimun Standards for Employment Arbitration, 6
World Arb. & Med. Rep. 50 (March 1995).
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wide" mandatory employment arbitration policies being adopted by a large
number of employers.155 It would prevent JAMS/Endispute from accepting
arbitrations in which the employer has imposed rules that restrict
employees' rights or ability to collect damages. 156 Michael Young, senior
mediator at JAMS/Endispute, questioned the mandatory arbitration process,
remarking, "individuals will not be able to go to court ... and there will
have been minimal, if any, negotiation between the parties as to procedures
or other terms of the arbitration clause." 157 Such concerns may have
animated the JAMS/Endispute standards but are not immediately visible in
the standards themselves. The JAMS/Endispute minimum arbitration
standards include:
(1) Ensuring that "rights and remedies" available under
applicable statutes are also available in arbitration;
(2) Providing for neutral arbitrators and ensuring that both
participants select the arbitrators;
(3) Providing that employee may be represented by counsel and
should not be discouraged from such representation;
(4) Providing that arbitration should include a minimum level of
discovery, including document exchange and deposition of
certain employer officials;
JAMS/Endispute encourages, but does not require:
(1) Cost allocation between the employer and employee so that
the employee is not precluded access to the procedures;
(2) The requirement of a reasoned award, particularly in
discrimination cases. 158
The JAMS/Endispute policy focuses mainly on the procedures of
arbitration and, significantly, requires that the arbitrating employee retain
the same avenues in the arbitration as she would in court. The standards,
however, do not preclude mandatory arbitration altogether but seek to
ensure fairness of the arbitration process once the employee encounters it.
The American Arbitration Association has been even more cautious in
155 The JAMS/Endispute Policy applies only to company-wide arbitration agreements
and not individually negotiated executive contracts. See Margaret A. Jacobs, Workers Call
Some Private Justice Unjust, WALLST. J., Jan. 26, 1995, at BI.
156 JAMS/Endispute Issues Minimum Standards for Employment Arbitration, supra note
154, at 50.
157 Id.
158 See id. at 50-51.
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its response to the criticisms of mandatory arbitration. AAA executives
initially feared that adopting a policy similar to JAMS/Endispute's would
scare off potential employers and hurt the AAA's ambitious marketing
efforts.15 9 Despite that concern, in June of 1995, the AAA implemented
experimental arbitration rules in California for a one-year trial basis
period.160 The AAA rules were drafted by an AAA advisory group that
obtained input from management, unions, plaintiffs and neutral
arbitrators.1 61 The trial rules strive to infuse a "fundamental fairness [into
the arbitration process] so the parties ... are playing on an even field."162
The AAA rules include such safeguards as:
(1) Procedures for neutral selection of an arbitrator;
(2) An administrative conference to organize and expedite the
arbitration; issues to be discussed at the conference include
date, time, place and duration of hearing, resolution of
outstanding discovery issues and parameters, exchange of
stipulations and declarations regarding facts, exhibits,
witnesses, witnesses' names and scope of testimony, form of
award and other issues;
(3) Provisions that the arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief
deemed just and equitable, including, but not limited to, any
remedy or relief that would have been available to the parties
had the matter been heard in court;
(4) Provisions that arbitrators shall award any fees, expenses and
compensation in favor of any party, including any administra-
tive fees or expenses due AAA;
(5) Reduction in the filing fees for the arbitration; and
(6) Provisions that arbitrator's award should be in writing. 163
Similar to the JAMS/Endispute rules, the AAA rules focus almost
exclusively on procedural safeguards of arbitration. The AAA rules provide
that participants of the arbitration may obtain the same relief they would in
court, but the arbitrators are not limited by such relief.164 Thus, under the
AAA rules, an employer potentially may draft an arbitration agreement that
159 See Jacobs, supra note 155, at BS.
160 See New Rules for Employment Disputes Make Arbitrators' Authority Explicit, Erpt.
Pol. & L. Daily, May 31, 1995, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNA-ELD File, at d2.
161 See id.
162Id.
163 AMERIPCAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE
RESOLUTION RULES (1995).
164 See id.
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adheres to all AAA standards and limits the relief, including punitive
damages, that may be obtained by employees.
Both the AAA and JAMS/Endispute rules seem to presume the
acceptability of binding arbitration, and instead focus on improving fairness
procedures once a potential claimant's judicial avenues have been
foreclosed. While these efforts are admirable, they should be monitored
continually and improved or discarded as necessary. Finally, such efforts at
improving process should be complemented by efforts to improve
voluntariness at the contracting stage and expand availability of judicial
review as suggested in Part VIII(B), infra.
VII. LABOR POLICY GROUPS: MORE PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
At least two policy groups, the Task Force on ADR in Employment
("ADR Task Force") and the United States Departments of Labor and
Commerce Dunlop Commission, have taken a similar approach as the
private ADR providers; that is, they have focused on improving the
procedures surrounding arbitration itself, rather than attempting to affect
mandatory arbitration at the contracting stage.
In August of 1994, the American Bar Association Committee on Labor
Arbitration and the Law of Collective Bargaining Agreements created a
"Task Force on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Employment," which
included members of the ABA section, representatives of the National
Academy of Arbitrators, the American Civil Liberties Union, the American
Arbitration Association, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and
others, to recommend standards for arbitration that would ensure due
process for all participants. 165 One member of the Task Force, Arnold
Zack, stated that arbitration guidelines were needed for private agreements
because "some people see this type of arbitration as rigged."166 On May 9,
1995, the ADR Task Force approved a prototype for extending due process
rights to employees in statutory arbitrations involving nonunion workers.
The prototype recommends a number of procedural safeguards, including
the following:
(1) Employees should have the right of representation of their own
choosing; employers should reimburse part of legal expense for
a portion of the employees' fees;
(2) All participants should have adequate but limited pre-trial
165 NAA President Outlines Proposals for ADR Standards in Non-Union Setting, Empl.
Pol. & L. Daily, Feb. 17, 1995, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNA-ELD File, at dl0.
16 6 ADR Task Force Approves Prototype for Arbitration of Statutory Rights, Empl. Pol.
& L. Daily, May 12, 1995, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNA-ELD File, at d7.
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discovery;
(3) Arbitrators should be qualified and should have skills in the
conduct of hearings, knowledge of the statutory issues at stake
in the dispute and familiarity with the workplace and
employment environment. There is a need for arbitrators with
special expertise, and there may be a need to reexamine
rostering eligibility of such agencies as the AAA to permit
expedited inclusion of those with valuable expertise;
(4) There is need for a training program to educate existing and
potential arbitrators as to statutes, including substantive,
procedural and remedial issues to be confronted and to train
experts in the statutes regarding employer-employee
relationships. Such training should be provided by government
agencies, bar associations and academic institutions, and
should be administered by a designating agency such as the
AAA; and
(5) Arbitrators will have the authority to award whatever relief is
available in court under the law, and the arbitrator should issue
a written opinion.167
The ADR Task Force's Prototype Agreement focuses on procedural
safeguards and offers the same types of protective measures as do the
JAMS/Endispute and AAA efforts. The Task Force's proposal, however,
places additional emphasis on adequate training of arbitrators. Currently,
the National Academy of Arbitrators, the ABA Labor and Employment Law
Section and the Employment Lawyers Association have endorsed the ADR
Task Force Protocol.168 The Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution
(SPIDR), however, has not endorsed the Protocol. 169 The Task Force could
not reach a consensus on certain issues, including whether an agreement to
arbitrate should be a condition of employment and whether employees
should be permitted to waive their right to judicial relief.170 The Task
Force, then, officially did not denounce pre-dispute arbitration but instead
sought to protect participants indirectly by ensuring that an employee facing
such an arbitration would encounter fair procedures.171
167 Prototype Agreement on Job Bias Dispute Resolution, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
91, d34 (May 11, 1995).
161 ABA Committee Debates Guidelines for Arbitrating Statutory Rights Disputes, Empl.
Pol. & L. Daily, Aug. 10, 1995, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNA-ELD File, at d9.
169 See id.
170 See ADR Task Force Approves Prototype for Arbitration of Statutory Rights, supra
note 166.
171 See id.
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Another policy group, the Commission on the Future of Worker-
Management Relations (Dunlop Commission), issued its Report and
Recommendations in January of 1995. The Dunlop Commission was more
outspoken than the ADR Task Force in denouncing mandatory arbitration
but not in offering suggestions for reform. The Commission, created by the
United States Departments of Labor and Commerce and chaired by former
Secretary of Labor John Dunlop, was charged with determining ways that
workplace disputes can be directly resolved by the parties involved rather
than through recourse to the courts and government agencies. 172 In an
interim "Fact-Finding Report" issued in early June 1994, the Commission
spoke of the possibility that arbitration may be more widely used in the
nonunion setting because it had been an effective process in the collective
bargaining setting. 173
The January 1995 Report, however, suggests that binding arbitration
agreements should not be enforceable as a condition of employment. The
Report calls for the courts to interpret the FAA as prohibiting mandatory
arbitration, and, failing court action, the Report calls for Congress to pass
legislation making it clear that any choice between available methods for
enforcing statutory employment rights should be left to the individual who
feels wronged rather than to the employment contract. 174 The Report
cryptically adds the caveat that its current view may be re-evaluated in the
future as employers experiment with ADR systems. 175 The Dunlop
Commission suggests (1) that private parties should be encouraged to adopt
in-house ADR systems, including in-house settlement procedures and
voluntary systems that meet fairness standards, and (2) that private
.arbitration systems meet key quality standards. 176 The Commission
recommends that an arbitration system, if it is to ensure effective protection
of employees' substantive legal rights, must include:
(1) a neutral arbitrator who knows the laws in question;
(2) a fair and simple method by which the employee can secure
the necessary information to present his or her claims;
(3) a fair method of cost-sharing between the employer and
employee to ensure affordable access to the system for all
172 See Dunlop Panel Hears Alternative for Resolving Workplace Disputes, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 188, d31 (Sept. 30, 1994).
173 See id.
174 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENTS OF LABOR AND COMMERCE, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS 42 (Jan. 1995), cited in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 6, d55 (Jan. 10, 1995).
175 See id.
176 See id. at 37.
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employees;
(4) the right to independent representation for the employee;
(5) a range of remedies equal to those available through
litigation;
(6) a written opinion by the arbitrator explaining the rationale
for the result; and
(7) sufficient judicial review to ensure that the result is
consistent with the governing laws. 177
Like the ADR Task Force Report, the Dunlop Commission
recommendation paints procedural fairness issues in broad strokes and gives
little substantive protection to the employee at the contracting stage.
Although the Dunlop Commission rejects the use of mandatory arbitration
at the contracting stage, it does not thoroughly detail its critique of the
arbitration process, thus shedding little light on the Commission's view of
the problems at the contracting stage and the reasons why they find pre-
dispute arbitration unacceptable.
178
VIII. FUTURE DIRECTIONS OF MANDATORY ARIBITRATION
A. Summary of Employment Actors' Responses
The various employment community actors have focused their
responses to mandatory arbitration after Gilmer primarily on the procedural
fairness stage of arbitration and, to some degree, the contracting stage. The
private ADR providers, AAA and JAMS/Endispute, have implemented
rules that largely seek to improve the procedures surrounding the arbitration
process. The policy groups, ADR Task Force and the Dunlop Commission,
also have issued recommendations for improving arbitration at the
procedural stage. Of those groups that have concentrated their responses on
the contracting stage of arbitration, two of them, Congress and the Dunlop
Commission, simply condemn the mandatory arbitration process altogether
and fail to focus on specific problematic areas or suggest solutions at the
contracting stage. Only the EEOC and, recently, the Ninth Circuit have
begun to address specific problems at the contracting stage, such as the
employee?'s lack of notice when signing a compulsory agreement. Virtually
none of the actors speak of the judicial review process. The courts
themselves have been loathe to reverse arbitration decisions involving
statutory employment rights, and only one such case has been reversed for
lack of arbitrator impartiality.
177 See id. at 40.
178 See id. at 42.
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B. Future Directions of Mandatory Arbitration
Although some commentators would advocate the abolition of
mandatory arbitration of civil rights claims altogether, it is unlikely that
mandatory arbitration will disappear from the employment horizon in the
near future. The federal courts virtually have embraced pre-dispute
arbitration of civil rights after the Gilmer decision, and reform efforts by
other employment actors have been piecemeal at best and ineffective at
worst. In the current employment atmosphere, where businesses are looking
to arbitration as a panacea to exorbitant court fees and lengthy litigation, the
employment community needs an approach to arbitration that retains
mandatory arbitration yet also improves upon it.
The preceding analysis of the employment community response to
mandatory arbitration has focused on the three stages of mandatory
arbitration, from contracting to procedural issues to judicial review. As
mentioned above, much effort from private ADR providers and labor policy
groups has focused on improving fairness procedures during the arbitration
process. While such efforts should be applauded and encouraged, they alone
are not enough. A more rational scheme for improving mandatory
arbitration should focus on improving the process of the remaining two
stages of the arbitration process: initial contracting and judicial review.
Without a tandem effort to improve all three stages, the pre-dispute
arbitration process risks trampling employee civil rights.
1. Fairness at the Contracting Stage
A functional approach to ensuring fairness for employees facing the
signing of an arbitration contract is to increase the protections at the
contracting stage. Employees should be given the opportunity to sign the
contract and waive the right to a judicial forum for impending civil rights
claims, but they only should be allowed to do so if they are provided the
opportunity to fully understand the essence of mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration and the concomitant release of certain rights to which they are
entitled. Contracting procedures should be improved to ensure an
employee's informed and knowledgeable waiver. The recent Ninth Circuit
Lai decision, 179 as well as the EEOC's response to River Oaks Imaging and
Diagnostic's ADR program 80 suggest criteria for improvement. Other
safeguards may be modeled after the OWBPA waiver provisions.
18
179 See Lai, 42 F.3d at 1299.
180 See EEOC Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction, supra note 145.
181 See OWBPA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(0(1)-(4) (1994), providing, in part:
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Certain uniform standards should govern the signing of mandatory
arbitration contracts: (1) an employee's right to court adjudication may not
be waived without a signed contract to such effect; (2) the employee's
waiver of her rights should be knowing and voluntary; and (3) an employee
may not be terminated for failure to sign a document waiving her right to a
court adjudication.
a. Knowing and Voluntary Signed Waiver
The first two criteria have a close relationship to one another; an
employee's knowing and voluntary waiver may not be obtained if the
employee does not have the opportunity to read and sign a contract to such
effect. The mandatory arbitration provision should not be printed solely in
an employee handbook182 or other company policy statement, but should
(1) An individual may not waive any right or claim under this chapter unless the waiver
is knowing and voluntary.... JAI waiver may not be considered knowing and voluntary
unless at a minimum-
(A) the waiver is part of an agreement between the individual and the employer
that is written in a manner calculated to be understood by the individual, or by the
average individual eligible to participate;
(B).the waiver specifically refers to rights or claims arising under this chapter;,
(C) the individual does not waive rights or claims that may arise after the date the
waiver is executed;
(D) the individual waives rights or claims only in exchange for consideration in
addition to anything of value to which the individual already is entitled;
(E) the individual is advised in writing to consult with an attorney prior to
executing the agreement;
(F)i) the individual is given a period of at least 21 days within which to consider
the agreement....
Id.
18 2 The Ninth Circuit's Nghiem decision may indicate that arbitration agreements
incorporated from a handbook are enforceable, but Nghlem should be narrowly construed to
its own facts. In Nghiem, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a lower court's decision that a former
employee of NEC was bound by an airbitrator's ruling in an arbitration between the employee
and NEC. The employee, however, had voluntarily submitted to arbitration in accordance
with NEC's handbook. Although not reaching the issue of whether the employee could have
been compelled to arbitrate his claims beforehand, the court did note that the FAA only
requires that an arbitration agreement be in writing, but does not require that the agreement be
signed by the parties thereto. Thus, Nghiem does not support the rationale that an employee
handbook can form a binding arbitration agreement because the court found the employee had
waived his right to object because he submitted to arbitration. See Nghiem, 25 F.3d at 1439.
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instead be in the form of a separate contract that places the employee on
notice of the potential waiver. 183 The contract should state in clear, specific
and unambiguous language the terms of the arbitration agreement, and
should contain a provision explaining the rights and claims an employee is
potentially sacrificing, such as the employee's right to file charges with the
EEOC. Businesses should be encouraged to place the notice provision on
the first page of the contract.I 4
The requirement of a contract signed both knowingly and voluntarily
by the employee is culled from the OWBPA provisions, the Lai decision
and the River Oaks Imaging and Diagnostic case. The OWBPA permits
waiver of the rights it seeks to protect, but only under certain circumstances
if the requisite safeguards are present. Under OWBPA Sections 626(f)(1)(A)
and (B), a waiver of rights under the Act is knowing and voluntary if it is
part of an agreement written in a manner calculated to be understood by the
individual and it specifically refers to rights or claims.18 5 By analogy, a pre-
dispute arbitration contract seeking to preclude a claimant from seeking
judicial review of hei claim under a civil rights statute should be a clearly
written agreement that specifically details the rights and claims an employee
relinquishes by signing the agreement.
The Ninth Circuit's recent Lai decision buttresses this criteria. In Lai,
the plaintiff-appellants were not bound by an agreement to arbitrate their
Title VII claims because the contract they signed did not describe the types
of disputes that would be subject to arbitration. 8 6 The Lai court's
requirement of notice, then, was the description of the types of suits to be
arbitrated.18 7 The proposed reforms incorporate the Lai rationale.
The River Oaks Imaging and Diagnostic Preliminary Injunction Order
pushes further along the requirement of notice and requires that employees
may sign an arbitration agreement only if such an agreement is accompanied
by a letter drafted by the EEOC that details the employee's rights to file
charges with the EEOC and any substantive and procedural rights which
183 see id.
184 However, state law efforts to require parties to place arbitration agreements
conspicuously on the front page of contracts have recently been struck down by the United
States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996);
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995). See also infra notes 193-199
and accompanying text.
185 See OWBPA, 29 U.S.C. § 626 (f)(1)(A) and (B) (1988 and Supp. 1995).
186 See Lai, 42 F.3d at 1305 (finding that employees could not have understood U-4
form when signing it because it did not describe types of disputes subject to arbitration, nor
did it mention Title VII claims).
17 See id.
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may be sacrificed if the employee makes an ADR election.18 s
Both the Ninth Circuit and the EEOC have addressed the problem of
notice and voluntariness in pre-dispute arbitration contracts. The reforms
suggested here incorporate the respective ideas of the federal court and the
EEOC, and use the OWBPA as a model to provide the framework for
ensuring fairness in the process through which employees waive their rights
to ajudicial forum.
b. Opportunity for Review; Consideration; No Retaliation for
Refusal to Sign
Additional safeguards that should surround the contracting of pre-
dispute arbitration are: (1) the contract clearly should state that the
employee has the right to consult with attorneys, and (2) the employer
should provide ample opportunity for the employee to seek legal advice or
review of the document. The employee also should have sufficient time to
deliberate before signing the document; a suggested time is twenty-one
days.
Finally, current employees who are given the opportunity to sign an
arbitration agreement adopted by the corporation after an employee has
begun working should receive some consideration for the signing of the
agreement. An employee who refuses to sign the arbitration agreement
should not be terminated in retaliation.
Again, the OWBPA provides a model for the proposed contracting
reforms. Under OWBPA Sections 626(f)(1)(E) and 626(f)(1)(F)(i), a waiver
is knowing and voluntary if an individual is advised in writing to consult
with an attorney prior to executing the agreement and given a period of at
least twenty-one days to consider the agreement.1 89 The OWBPA also
provides that the waiver must be exchanged for value if it is to be valid.190
The Preliminary Injunction Order in River Oaks Imaging and
Diagnostic prohibited the partnership from retaliating against current and
former employees for refusing to sign the arbitration agreement. 191 The
188 See River Oaks Imaging and Diagnostic, 1995 WL 264003 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 19,
1995), Preliminary Injunction Order (holding that ROID may introduce revised ADR Policy
which employees may sign only if accompanied by a letter drafted by the EEOC, which
explains the employees' rights to file charges with the EEOC and any substantive and
procedural rights which may be sacrificed if an ADR election is made).
1 89 See OWEPA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(0(1)(E) & 626(0(1)(E-)(i).
190 See OWBPA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)I)(D) (waiver is knowing and voluntary if
individual waives rights or claims in exchange for consideration in addition to anything of
value to which individual already is entitled).
191 See River Oaks Imaging and Diagnostic, 1995 WL 264003 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 19,
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court's concern in River Oaks Imaging and Diagnostic is pivotal: If
retaliatory firing is not prohibited in reforms surrounding the contractual
stage of pre-dispute arbitration, the notion of voluntariness is compromised
and other potential safeguards will become meaningless.
The suggested safeguards are not exclusive and should provide a
baseline for discussion and dialogue among employment community actors.
The focus on ensuring fairness at the contracting stage of pre-dispute
arbitration will provide a solid framework of protections for employees who
are faced with such agreements. These suggested elements and others like
them should be required before an employer imposes mandatory arbitration
upon an employee. While according to the Supreme Court in Gilmer, mere
inequality in bargaining position may not be enough to nullify an arbitration
agreement, 192 these safeguards seek to level the playing field for employers
and employees.
The implementation of the suggested reforms at the contracting stage
may not be accomplished directly by state statute in light of a recent
Supreme Court decision that interprets the FAA as upholding the validity of
arbitration provisions in contracts unless the contract itself could be
invalidated under state contract law principles. This decision, however,
does not spell the end for relief at the contracting stage but rather changes
the focus of the implementation. If state legislation is not viable, then the
FAA itself could be amended to include reforms, or private ADR providers
such as AAA and JAMS/Endispute indirectly could enforce such reforms by
refusing to accept arbitrations that did not adopt the proposed safeguards in
the arbitration contracts.
In Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto,193 the United States Supreme
Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted a Montana statute
that attempted to provide better protection for individuals at the contracting
stage of arbitration. The Montana statute declared an arbitration clause
unenforceable unless notice that the contract is subject to arbitration is typed
in underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract. 194 Following
that law, the Montana Supreme Court invalidated an arbitration contract
contained in a franchise agreement because the arbitration clause was
located on page nine in ordinary type. 195 The United States Supreme Court
then granted certiorari for the first time in 1995, and vacated and remanded
1995), Preliminary njunction Order at 3.
192 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33.
193 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996).
194 See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1995).
195 See Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931 (Mont. 1994), vacated sub nor. Doctor's
Assocs., Inc. v. Casarolto, 115 S. Ct. 2552 (1995).
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the case to Montana. 196 On rehearing, the Montana Supreme Court
reaffirmed the prior opinion, relying on its earlier reasoning that the
Montana statute was not inconsistent with the goals and policies of the FAA
and thus was valid. 197 In its most recent decision, the United States
Supreme Court again reversed the Montana Supreme Court and clarified its
position regarding the Montana law. 198 The Court held that the state courts
may not "invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only
to arbitration provisions" and that arbitration provisions may not be
"singled out" for "suspect status." 199
Although Casarotto makes clear that state laws may not find arbitration
provisions to be lacking simply because participants were not given
adequate notice, reform efforts should not be long stymied but rather
redirected. Even if state legislatures cannot single out suspect arbitration
clauses, other employment community actors should continue the battle in
their respective sectors.
2. Increased Availability of Judicial Review
The Gilmer Court effectively invited the employment community to
experiment with the procedures surrounding mandatory arbitration, noting
that "the claimed procedural inadequacies [that Plaintiff Gilmer alleges]...
[are] best left for resolution in specific cases.
2°°
Since Gilmer, as this Article recounts, the employment community has
struggled with the "experimentation" of procedural issues surrounding
mandatory arbitration. The private ADR providers and labor groups have
focused their efforts on improving the procedures surrounding the
arbitration process itself. For their part, the federal courts have struggled
with the process of judicial review, but constrained by the narrow grounds
of review under the FAA, they have overturned an employee arbitration
only once.
The important status of civil rights in the fabric of the employment
relationship dictates that more experimentation with judicial review of
arbitration in the federal courts is necessary. And, as Professors Martin
Malin and Robert Ladenson discuss in a 1993 article, increased availability
of judicial review of arbitration decisions is especially crucial in the private
arbitration context because of the lack of accountability in a single system of
196 See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 115 S. Ct. 2552 (1995).
197 See Casarotto v. Lombardi, 901 P.2d 596 (Mont. 1995), rev'd sub nom. Doctor's
Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996).
198 Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996).
199 Id. at 1746.
200 Gibner, 500 U.S. at 33.
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public anti-discrimination law. 20 1 The danger is great that individual private
employment arbitrators will apply a law such as Title VII in a conflicting
manner; such danger largely goes unchecked because of the unavailability of
judicial review. Without more substantive review by a uniform judicial
system, private arbitration runs the risk of diminishing the effect and
understanding of our public anti-discrimination laws because employers and
employees alike will not have a uniform standard of the boundaries of
discriminatory action.
The current system of judicial review under the FAA is severely limited
and is inadequate to ensure the protection of civil rights. This Article
proposes that the FAA should be amended to allow additional substantive
grounds for judicial review.
3. Proposed Amendment to the FAA
Judicial review of arbitration decisions purposely is circumscribed
under the FAA to promote the finality, and thus the viability, of arbitration
as an alternative to judicial remedies. 202 Accordingly, Section 10 of the
FAA is highly tailored to instances where a court may overturn an
arbitrator's decision; only where there is arbitrator fraud, partiality or
misconduct in procedural issues may the district court vacate the
arbitration. 2 3 In addition, many courts have reformulated Section 10(4),
which allows a court to vacate the decisions of arbitrators when they have
exceeded their powers or imperfectly executed them, to allow vacation of
arbitral awards for "manifest disregard of the law." 204 The manifest
201 See Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurispndential
Perspective on Labor and Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer,
44 HASTINGS LJ. 1187, 1227 (1993). The authors contrast private employment arbitration
with arbitration in the labor law context which does not involve public law interpretation but
rather application of private collective bargaining agreements. See id.
202 See, e.g., Inter-City Gas Corp. v. Boise Cascade Corp., 845 F.2d 184 (8th Cir.
1988) (holding that judicial review of arbitration awards is restricted and courts will not
review merits of awards).
203 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10(a)-10(e) (1994).
204 See, e.g., Health Servs. Management Corp. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253 (7th Cir.
1992); Todd Shipyards v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1991); Fahnestock &
Co. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 942 (1991) and 502 U.S.
1120 (1992); Employers Ins. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 933 F.2d 1481 (9th Cir. 1991);
O.R. Sec., Inc. v. Professional Planners Assoc., 857 F.2d 742 (lth Cir. 1988); Jenkins v.
Prudential-Bache See., Inc., 847 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1988); Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi
Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1141 (1986); Merrill, Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1986).
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disregard doctrine is formulated largely from dicta in the 1953 Supreme
Court case Wilkco v. Swan,20 5 and the federal courts are split in its efficacy
to arbitral review. 2 6 Notwithstanding the attention given its application by
many courts, the manifest disregard standard is a stringent one and does
little to provide additional grounds for substantive review by the
judiciary.20 7 Thus, because the grounds for vacation are so narrow, an
effective change in the availability of judicial review can only be
accomplished by direct amendment of the FAA. The statute should be
amended to correct the inadequacieg of the current review system for
mandatory arbitration.
This Article suggests a proposed amendment to the FAA that would
allow courts to vacate arbitration awards when the arbitrators have
misapplied or misinterpreted applicable law. The amendment to allow
review of misapplied law strikes a balance between the manifest disregard
doctrine adopted by some federal circuits and de novo review of all
questions of law considered in arbitration.
Currently, the circuit courts do not agree on the elements or the
application of the manifest disregard doctrine. Yet, as some commentators
205 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). In Wilko, the Court states in dicta: "the interpretation of
the law by arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal courts, to
judicial review for error in interpretation." Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-437 (emphasis added).
2 0 6 Te Second, Ninth and D.C. Circuits have formally adopted the manifest disregard
standard. See, e.g., Sargent v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc,, 882 F.2d 529 (D.C.
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1028 (1990); Bobker, 808 F.2d at 933-934; French v.
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 784 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1986). The Fourth,
Seventh, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have heard cases on the issue but have not formally
adopted or rejected the standard. See, e.g., Miller v. Prudential-Bache See., Inc., 884 F.2d
128 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1004 (1990); O.R. Securities, 857 F.2d 742;
Stroh Container, 783 F.2d 743; MSP Collaborative v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 596 F.2d 247
(7th Cir. 1979). Only the Fifth Circuit has expressly refused to adopt the manifest disregard
standard. See R.M. Perez & Assoc. v. Welch, 960 F.2d 534, 590 (5th Cir. 1992).
207 See, e.g., Bobker, 80 F.2d at 933 (finding that "[m]anifest disregard ... means
more than error or misunderstanding with respect to the law .... mhe term 'disregard'
implies that the arbitrator appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but
decides to ignore or pay no attention to it."). See also Christine Godsil Cooper, Where Are
We Going with Gilmer?-Some Ruminations on the Arbitration of Discrimination Claims, II
ST. LoUIS U. PUB. L. REv. 203, 217 (1992). Prof. Cooper has suggested that in sexual
harassment arbitration, an arbitral award would not be vacated by a court if an arbitrator
mistakenly states that Title VII does not cover sexual harassment. Instead, she suggests, the
award would only be vacated under manifest disregard principles if the arbitrator stated that
he knew Title VII prohibited the conduct but refused to apply it. See id.
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note, in its strictest form, the doctrine will only allow judicial courts to
reverse the arbitration award in extreme cases when, an arbitrator refuses to
apply what she knows to be the applicable law.208 The stringency of the
extreme interpretation manifest disregard doctrine makes it a less-than-ideal
substitute for a more moderate statutory amendment that uniformly adopts a
standard for judicial review that applies when the law is misinterpreted in
light of settled precedent. At the polar extreme from the strict manifest
disregard doctrine is the similarly dissatisfactory option of allowing judges
de novo review of arbitration decisions.20 9 This standard also is unattractive
because it would allow arbitration participants too much access to the courts
and would undermine the benefit of arbitration as a binding and final
alternative to the court system. A better option is a judicial review standard
that only allows judges to reverse opinions for misapplication of the law
because it preserves the finality of arbitration yet also protects its
participants from the misuse of laws, especially those involving civil rights.
The proposed standard of review for arbitration decisions places the
burden on the party seeking reversal to show that the law was misapplied.
To safeguard the binding quality of arbitration and discourage automatic
appeals, a party seeking review should be required to: (1) make a prima
facie case that a law applies in her case; (2) show that the law has a
relatively standard application as applied by the courts and list the elements
of the law with supporting precedent; and (3) detail the arbitrator's
application of the law in the decision, illustrating where the law was
misapplied or misinterpreted.
This judicial reform effort is a starting point for discussion and analysis
in the courts, the legislature and the employment community. Later
commentators and actors in the arbitration process will need to develop
certain factors in the process to allow judicial reform to work effectively.
For instance, a judicial review standard that places the burden on the
appealing party is dependent upon the requirement of a written, well-
reasoned arbitration decision. Although many arbitration actors have
suggested such a requirement, 210 in the future, written opinions must be
more than an option for arbitrators; they must be a requisite component of a
valid arbitration because a reviewing court may need the opinion.
An additional factor to be debated in the employment community is the
requirement that the moving party demonstrate the established application of
the law in order to allege that the arbitrator misapplied it. Such a
requirement likely will have the effect of discouraging arbitration appeals
208 See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 207, at 217.
209 See Malin & Ladenson, supra note 201, at 1240. Malin and Ladenson suggest that
courts review arbitral awards de novo for conclusions of law. See id.
2 10
See supra Parts VI & VII.
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where applicable law does not have a standard application in reported
precedent, either because it is recently enacted and courts have not had the
opportunity to consider it or because it is broadly drafted so as to allow no
single application. In such a case, a moving party will find it more difficult
to prove her case and have an appeal heard in court. This "cost" may be a
necessary one that is outweighed by the benefits of preserving the finality of
arbitration by adopting a judicial review standard that is not dangerously
over-broad.
Finally, the interaction between the two proposed reforms in this paper
needs to be addressed. The first reform focuses on improving disclosure
procedures at the contracting stage of a mandatory arbitration agreement in
order to ensure that the process becomes a voluntary choice for its
participants. 21' In this regard, the suggestions for improving the
voluntariness of the arbitration essentially strive to erase the distinction
between pre- and post-dispute arbitration. The ultimate goal, then, of the
mandatory arbitration contracting reforms is the creation of a pre-dispute
arbitration commitment that is equivalent to a post-dispute arbitration
commitment, with the only distinction being the timing of the agreement
rather than the voluntary nature of the judicial forum waiver.
Thus, in recognition of that goal, the suggestions for reform at the
judicial review stage do not distinguish between pre- and post-dispute
arbitrations but apply to all arbitration decisions regardless of origin. It is
essential that the two reforms occur in tandem with one another as well as
with continued reform of the procedures surrounding arbitration. A
piecemeal reform effort will only serve to weaken the effect of the
respective proposals so that little substantive improvement in pre-dispute
contracting will occur.
IX. CONCLUSION
Since Gilmer, the federal courts and other labor and employment actors
have endorsed the use of pre-dispute arbitration as a mechanism for
resolving employee civil rights disputes. Many actors in the employment
community, however, continue the struggle to improve the equity of the
process for its participants. Private ADR and legal and governmental policy
groups are making headway by experimenting and improving upon the
procedural fairness of arbitration itself, but the employment community
must expend more effort in improving the arbitration process at both the
contracting and judicial review stages. An employee faced with a pre-
dispute arbitration contract should be ensured of procedural fairness in
arbitrating the claim, but she also should be well-informed of the costs of
211 See supra Part VIll.B.1.
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signing the document and assured of an opportunity for judicial review if
the law is incorrectly applied. Mandatory arbitration, if it is to function as a
palatable alternative to litigation and a cost-effective option for employers,
must gain comparable credibility in the eyes of its participants by becoming
a more voluntary and informed dispute resolution option.
